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I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1984 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 ("Amendments").' The Amendments were a direct response
to the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co. 2 The Court, in a plurality opinion, had held that the broad grant of
jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges provided by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
("Reform Act") violated article III of the Constitution. 3 The jurisdictional grant in
the Reform Act gave bankruptcy judges broad powers but did not protect them with
life tenure and prohibitions against reductions in salary, the essential protections of
the independence of federal courts exercising the judicial power of the United States. 4
Congress began hearings to determine how to correct the flaw in the jurisdic-
tional grant less than three weeks after the Northern Pipeline decision. 5 Despite
urgings from bankruptcy judges, practitioners, scholars, and creditors' groups,
Congress declined to cure the defect by extending article III status to bankruptcy
judges.6 The solution adopted by Congress in the 1984 Amendments relegates
bankruptcy courts to a role as adjuncts to the district courts. 7 Congress granted
jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings to the district courts, which may refer
certain proceedings to the bankruptcy courts. 8 This solution to the constitutionality
problem is a hybrid between the pre-Reform Act referee system and a more limited
version of the Reform Act's broad jurisdictional grant.
1. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. 1, 98 Stat. 333 (to
be codified in scattered sections of II U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Amendments].
2. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
3. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88 n.40 (1982). The Bankruptcy
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. II, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2657, 2668 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982)),
granted the bankruptcy court "all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts." (emphasis added).
The Court held that this grant violated article In of the Constitution. Article III requires that "[tihe judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office." U.S. Co.nr. art. III, § 1. Four opinions were written. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, joined
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, must be read with the much narrower concurring opinion of Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, to ascertain what the Court actually held. Justice Rehnquist viewed as
unconstitutional "so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy Court to entertain and decide Northem's
[claims arising under state law] . Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91
(1982). See infra note 49.
4. See Krattcnmaker, Article IlI and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitu-
tional, 70 GEe. L.J. 297 (1982) (proposing that article 11 must be read literally, with the conclusion that life tenure and
salary protections are mandatory requirements for the bankruptcy courts). For an in-depth discussion of Northern
Pipeline's possible ramifications for administrative agencies and other article I courts, see Redish, Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197 (1983).
5. Northern Pipeline Bankruptcy Decision, 1982: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
6. See infra subpart IV (A).
7. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text. See also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 17,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE Coso. & An. NEws 5787, 5802-03.
8. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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This Note will briefly examine bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction prior to 19789 and
the Reform Act's broad jurisdictional grant, focusing on the problems in the bank-
ruptcy system that Congress intended the broad jurisdictional grant to solve. 10 The
Northern Pipeline decision, invalidating the Reform Act's jurisdictional grant, will be
considered.11 After briefly examining the Emergency Rule, 12 this Note will review
the options available to Congress, particularly that of extending article HI status to the
bankruptcy judgeships.13 Finally, this Note will evaluate the new jurisdictional grant
and procedures of the 1984 Amendments.' 4 Two major questions are considered:
first, whether the 1984 Amendments solve the constitutional dilemma posed by
Northern Pipeline; and second, whether the 1984 Amendments meet the original
goals of the broad jurisdictional grant of the Reform Act.
A. Pre-1978 Bankruptcy System
Prior to the Reform Act, the district courts were the bankruptcy courts. 15 The
district courts had original jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings in bank-
ruptcy; 16 however, the district courts could refer to bankruptcy referees any "pure
bankruptcy" questions. 17 Generally, the bankruptcy referees could hear adversarial
claims in either of two circumstances: 18 when the parties consented to the bankruptcy
referee's jurisdiction, 19 and when the bankruptcy court exercised summary (as
opposed to plenary) jurisdiction because the claim related to property over which the
court exercised direct control. 20
The referee system's jurisdictional basis proved problematic. The distinction
between plenary and summary jurisdiction, an issue of constant litigation, wasted
both time and money. 2' Often the sole function of a trial was to determine whether
9. See infra subpart I(A).
10. See infra subpart I(B).
11. See infra part II.
12. See infra notes 63-65.
13. See infra parts II-IV.
14. See infra part V.
15. See 1 COWER ON BLsusrrcv 14 ed. (MB) 1.10 (1968).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West Supp. 1985)). For the version to
have been implemented by the Reform Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982). This version never took effect, and was
eliminated by the 1984 Amendments. Pub. L. 98-353, § 122(c), tit. I, 98 Stat. 346.
17. S. Ct. R. Bankr. P. 102(a). (1982). The reference procedure was changed so that the clerk automatically
referred the case to a referee without any involvement by the district court. The district court judge could act on a case
only after withdrawing it for cause.
18. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDs CoNG. & An. News 5963, 5965,
5969 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
19. The bankruptcy courts were restricted from hearing suits which could not have been brought in the bankruptcy
court absent the bankruptcy unless the parties consented. E.g., Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947). See also 2
CouLie ON BANKsuvrcv 14 ed. (MB) 23.14 (1974).
20. See 1 CouaR ON BANKRu'rcy 15 ed. (MB) 3.01 pp. 3-22 (1985).
21. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CD CoNG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5803
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. See also Note, Scope of Summary Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, 40 CoL.IN.
L. REv. 489, 490 n.2 (1940) (litigation over the issue of plenary/summary jurisdiction appeared in every volume of the
Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement between 1898 and 1940). This situation remained unchanged, and was a major
concern of the Reform Act. HoUsE REPORT, supra note 18, at 45 n.27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE Coo. & AD. News
6006-07. See also House CMIM'N ON THE BmARNx 'rcv LAws OF TE UsrrEo STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137 (Part I & II), 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 88-92 (1973).
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the bankruptcy referee was empowered to hear the claim. 2 Moreover, jurisdiction by
consent often resulted in cases in which a party unknowingly consented to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. 23 The process became known as "jurisdiction by
ambush" among bankruptcy litigants.2 4
The wasteful and confusing fragmentation of jurisdiction was a major problem
of the pre-1978 system which the Reform Act attempted to solve.23 Often a bank-
ruptcy question remained unsettled for a considerable period of time pending the
outcome of a question that had to be tried in the district or state court. 26 These
excessive delays posed a very real problem, prejudicing the parties, debtors and
creditors alike. In most bankruptcies a debtor, either an individual or a corporate
entity, is in poor financial shape and fighting for survival. Quite often a quick
resolution of issues is essential if the debtor is to form a plan to pay creditors or
reorganize in time to survive. The protections provided by Congress in Title 11 are
intended to provide the judicial machinery for a speedy resolution of the issues and
to safeguard creditors from any further deterioration of the assets of the estate. 27 Of
course, creditors are best protected by measures which assist the debtor in recovering
so that the debts can be paid. But when recovery is not forthcoming, a speedy winding
up and distribution of the debtor's estate is the next best thing for the creditors'
protection.
The jurisdictional snafus in the pre-Reform Act bankruptcy system were also
very costly for litigants.2 8 Frequently, a claim had to be litigated practically in its
entirety just to determine which court could hear it.29 Often the debtor's estate had to
litigate issues in state court, district court, and bankruptcy court.30 The cost of
litigating in three different forums is clearly more burdensome than litigating in a
single bankruptcy forum, empowered to hear all the claims.
In the final analysis, the costs 6f excessive litigation are bome by the unsecured
creditors. Any cost incurred by the estate in defending or pursuing any claim of or
against the debtor merely diminishes the estate so that fewer assets are available upon
a final distribution to the unsecured creditors. For these reasons, another major goal
of the Reform Act was to grant bankruptcy judges the power to hear and determine
all bankruptcy problems quickly and cost-efficiently in a single forum. 31
22. SENArE Fuour, supra note 21, at 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE Coso. & An. NEws 5803.
23. Consent could be express, implied, or by failure to enter a proper objection. See generally 2 CoLwreR oN
BAsntrwrcy 14 ed. (MB) T 23.06 (1974).
24. House REPoRT, supra note 18, at 43, 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE Coca. & AD. News 6004, 6010.
25. The Reform Act was intended to eliminate the sunmary/plenary jurisdiction dichotomy entirely. SENATE R PORT,
supra note 21, at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. ConE Com. & An. NEws 5804.
26. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoE CoNG. & AD. NEws 5803.
27. See infra note 35.
28. House REPoRT, supra note 18, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD. NEws 6010.
29. Id.
30. SENATE REoRr, supra note 21, at 17-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDe Coca. & AD. NEws 5803-04.
31. Id.
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B. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197832 constituted the first major revision of
bankruptcy law since the Chandler Act of 1938. 33 The Reform Act was the product
of years of discussion and consideration by both houses of Congress of how to
streamline the burgeoning bankruptcy process.34 The result was a major revision in
both substance and procedure. 35
Congress was concerned with attracting the highest quality individuals to the
bankruptcy bench, to enable the bankruptcy courts to keep pace with the major
substantive revisions of bankruptcy law and the important role the system played in
regulating debtor-creditor rights and in commerce in general. 36 The district courts,
burdened by their own overcrowded dockets, 37 were simply unable to handle the
massive bankruptcy workload. In addition, the bankruptcy system had come to rely
on the expertise of the referees to handle the intricacies of bankruptcy, since the
district courts had to focus their attentions on other, often more esoteric, matters
clogging their calendars. 38 The reality was that the bankruptcy system was already
acting with de facto independence. 39 For these reasons, upgrading the status of
bankruptcy judges became an essential component of any major revision in bank-
ruptcy law or procedure.
Article E[ status for the judges was urged by many, and favored by the House,
as the best way to upgrade the status of bankruptcy judges and attract the most
qualified candidates.4n The prevailing Senate view, however, opposed risking the
disruption of the current federal judiciary by granting article III protections to
bankruptcy judges. 41
Bankruptcy cases now underway involve billions of dollars, hundreds of thou-
sands of debtors and creditors, and complex legal issues.42 The sheer volume of cases
32. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at scattered provisions of 11 and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred
to as Reform Act].
33. Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed by the Reform Act).
34. For a detailed examination of the lengthy legislative process involved in passage of the Reform Act, see Klee,
Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL . REv. 941 (1979).
35. See generally Eisen & Smrtnik, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-An Elevated Judiciary, 28 DE PAUL .
REv. 1007 (1979).
36. House REPor, supra note 18, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6010.
37. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODe CONG. & An. NEws 5965.
38. Id. at 9, 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & An. NEws 5970, 5975 (noting that the Bankruptcy
Commission and the Judicial Conference both recognized the lack of interest among district judges in bankruptcy matters).
See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text for the number of case filings in each court system.
39. Id.
40. See House REroRr, supra note 18, at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6013-14. The House
position was stated very clearly as it was introduced in its compromise form:
The principal area of disagreement between the House and Senate dealt with the structure of the court system.
It was the House position that the bankruptcy court should be an independent article HI court in every sense of
the word, as are the U.S. district courts. It was the House position, after extensive debate and argument on the
floor, that we would have separate, independent, and life-tenured judges in the bankruptcy courts.
Id. 124 CoNG. REc. 32,391 (1978) (statement of Congressman Butler).
41. 124 CoNG. REc. 28,258 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). For an examination of the lengthy legislative
process culminating in the Reform Act, see Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REv.
941 (1979).
42. Congressman Rodino opened floor debate on the Reform Act by noting the enormous volume of bankruptcy
cases. He noted that the bankruptcy system had far outgrown its status as contemplated by existing legislation, processing
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supports the claim that the highest quality individuals are needed to serve as
bankruptcy judges. Between June 30, 1982, and July 1, 1983, 535,597 bankruptcy
cases were filed; 171,623 adversary proceedings were filed in those bankruptcy
cases.4 3 During the same time period, only 276,523 civil and criminal cases combined
were filed in the entire federal district court system.44 Although the Senate's position
opposing granting article I status to the bankruptcy judgeships prevailed, the broad
grant of jurisdiction in the Reform Act was nevertheless intended to upgrade the status
and prestige of the bankruptcy judgeships. Surely the litigants in the bankruptcy court
system are entitled to have judges of the highest quality hear and decide their claims. 45
11. THE NORTHERN PIPELINE DECISION
The Northern Pipeline decision did little to clarify a confusing area of consti-
tutional law.46 The question of what limitations article Ill places on Congress' power
to establish article I courts is both confusing and beyond the scope of this Note. 47
What is clear is that the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline intended that Congress
restructure the jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy courts in a way that would meet the
legislative purpose of the Reform Act and conform to the requirements of article 111.48
Northern Pipeline, however, provided Congress with little guidance as to what
restructuring article III required. 49 Four separate opinions were written, and the
reasoning and constitutional analysis in each are confusing.50 Reading the plurality
and concurring opinions together, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that it was
unconstitutional for a bankruptcy court to exercise the judicial power of the United
States in determining a claim based in contract law when the judge does not have the
over 250,000 cases per year, involving more than nine million creditors, over 27 billion dollars in assets, and over 43
billion dollars in claims. He further observed that the total number of cases filed in bankruptcy courts exceeded the
combined number of civil and criminal cases filed in the federal courts. 123 CoNe. Rec. 35,444 (1977).
43. JUtIcLM. CONFEEN cE o THE UNm STATES REPORT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREcTOR OF THE ADMINISRATWE OFFICE OF
TE Umm STATES CouTs 418,428 (1983). This was an increase from the 519,063 bankruptcy filings and 94,632 adversary
proceedings filed in 1981. JutaAL Co NFeECE or THE Umrrs STATES REPORT, ANNuAL REPORT OF Tm DIECTOR OF THE
Ac.iu mSnVsnE OFICE OF TIM UNITED STATES CouRTS 240, 242 (1981).
44. Id. at 122, 164.
45. For a complete discussion of the status issue, see Eisen & Smrtnik, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-An
Elevated Judiciary, 28 DR PAUL L. REv. 1007 (1979).
46. The entire area of constitutional limitations on non-article Ill courts is problematic. In an earlier plurality
opinion, Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, Justice Harlan remarked that the distinction in cases between .'constitutional' and
'legislative' courts has been productive of much confusion and controversy." 370 U.S. 530, 534 (1962). Rather than
clearing up any confusion, Northern Pipeline added to it. Professor Redish has observed that "[a]ll four opinions written
in the decision are plagued by questionable reasoning. Each, in varying degrees, adopts guidelines for allocating authority
between article III and non-article III bodies which are without legitimate basis in logic or in constitutional language,
history, or policy." Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 197, 200 (1983). Professor Redish further noted that, at the least, Congress would face serious problems trying to
restructure the bankruptcy courts to conform with article III after Northern Pipeline, and that the ramifications may be
much greater if Justice Brennan's analysis is applicable to all article I courts. Professor Redish concluded that if the
reasoning of the Court is extended to its logical conclusion, much of the work done by federal administrative agencies may
be unconstitutional. Id.
47. For an examination of how Northern Pipeline might affect this question, see Redish, supra note 46, and
Fullerton, No Light at the End of the Pipeline: Confusion Surrounds Legislative Courts, 49 BROOrLYN L. REv. 207 (1983).
48. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982).
49. Fullerton, supra note 47, at 227. See generally Redish, supra note 46. Only Chief Justice Burger's dissent
contained any advice for Congress. See infra text accompanying note 144.
50. See supra note 46. See also Fullerton, supra note 47.
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protections of life tenure and a prohibition against reduction of salary required by
article 111.51 Only article III judges can exercise the judicial power of the United States
and enter final judgements on state law claims. 52 The broad grant of jurisdiction in the
Reform Act over "all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related
to cases under Title 11" was thus unconstitutional. 5 3
The constitutional dilemma posed by Northern Pipeline was further complicated
because any invalid part of the jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy courts was insep-
arable from any arguably valid grant of jurisdiction.5 4 The entire grant of jurisdiction
was thus held unconstitutional due to the impossibility of severing the invalid part.55
This inseverability, added to the lack of a majority position, left unclear what changes
in the jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy judges were required to pass constitutional
muster.5
6
1Il. THE EMERGENCY RULE
The Northern Pipeline case was decided on June 28, 1982. 5 7 The Supreme Court
stayed the effect of the decision until October 4, 1982, so that Congress could rectify
the constitutionality problem without totally disrupting the operation of the bank-
ruptcy courts.5 8 However, as Congress had already considered the problem for
years, 59 no solution was forthcoming from that body in just three months. o When the
first deadline was not met, the Supreme Court extended the stay through December
24, 1982.61
When it became clear that Congress would not meet the second deadline, 62 the
Judicial Conference drafted the Sample Order and Model Rule for the Continued
Operation of the Bankruptcy Courts ("Emergency Rule"). 63 This permitted the
51. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). See supra note 3. For Chief
Justice Burger's statement of the Court's holding in his dissent, see infra text accompanying note 144.
52. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982). See U.S. Cor. art. Ill,
§ 1; supra note 3.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1982), repealed by the 1984 Amendments, Pub. L. 98-353, tit. I, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
54. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88, 91-92 (1982).
55. Id. at 87-88 n.40 (1982). Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion is far narrower than the publiclprivate
rights dichotomy stressed by the plurality. After making the limits of both his concurrence and his analysis clear, he
concurred in the judgment "because [he] agree[d] with the plurality that this grant of authority is not readily
severable from the remaining grant of authority to bankruptcy courts under § 1471 ..... Id. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
56. See supra notes 46, 49.
57. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
58. Id. at 88.
59. Congress first established a commission in 1970, fourteen years prior to the Amendments, to recommend the
needed changes in bankruptcy law. COMM'N ON THE BNuruncy LAws OF T'm UerrED STATEs, H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. 1, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973). (Part 1 deals mainly with bankruptcy administration and the court system.) For a detailed
examination of the legislative deliberations culminating in the Reform Act, see Klee, supra note 34.
60. Ironically, the 1984 Amendments were finally passed on June 29, 1984, exactly two years after the Supreme
Court decided Northern Pipeline on June 28, 1982. See 130 Corn. REc. H7489, S8887 (daily ed. June 29, 1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD. NEws 576, 581.
61. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
62. On December 23, 1983, the Court refused to grant a further extension when the second extension expired.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 459 U.S. 1094 (1983).
63. 11 U.S.C. app. at 521 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Emergency Rule].
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bankruptcy courts to continue operating until Congress took action. 64 The Emergency
Rule was drafted with due precaution towards the constitutional limitations of
Northern Pipeline.65
The Judicial Conference proposed three main restrictions on the bankruptcy
courts' authority in the Emergency Rule. The first precautionary measure required
distinguishing between a traditional bankruptcy proceeding and a related proceed-
ing.6 A bankruptcy judge could not issue a binding judgment in a related proceed-
ing.67 In any related proceeding findings of fact and proposed rulings were to be
submitted to the district court judge for de novo review. 68 Section (d)(3)(A) of the
Emergency Rule provided:
Related proceedings are those civil proceedings that, in the absence of a petition in
bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or state court. Related proceedings
include, but are not limited to, claims brought by the estate against parties who have not
filed claims against the estate .... A proceeding is not a related proceeding merely
because the outcome will be affected by state law. 69
A second measure in the Emergency Rule, incorporated to assure constitutional
compliance, was a grant of authority to the district court to revoke the referral of any
case to the bankruptcy court.70 This could be done upon the request of a party or upon
the court's own motion. 71 A third measure provided that the district court did not have
to defer to the factual findings or interpretations of law made by the bankruptcy judge,
even in traditional bankruptcy proceedings. 72
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA
The jurisdictional problems recognized by Northern Pipeline were not unantic-
ipated by Congress. 73 Senator Heflin opened the hearings of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the Northern Pipeline decision by noting that the Reform Act was the
culmination of years of joint effort by the House and Senate to streamline the
bankruptcy process to end the unnecessary expense and delay that had plagued the
64. The Emergency Rule was promulgated to avoid a complete shutdown of the bankruptcy court system. After
Northern Pipeline it was frequently argued that the entire grant of jurisdiction of both the bankruptcy courts and the district
courts over any bankruptcy matter was invalidated. See In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1577 (2d Cir. 1983). Although most
courts rejected the argument that district courts did not retain jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters following Northern
Pipeline, e.g., Kaiser, some courts ruled that the federal courts were completely without bankruptcy jurisdiction after
Northern Pipeline, e.g., In re Conley, 26 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); Winters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Schear Group, 25 Bankr. 463 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
65. Acceptance of the Emergency Rule was far from uniform. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused
to apply the Emergency Rule's requirement of de novo review of the bankruptcy judge's findings, holding in favor of the
clearly erroneous standard adopted in the bankruptcy rules prior to Northern Pipeline. In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100, 104
(3d Cir. 1983). Contra 1616 Reminc Limited Partnership v. Atchinson & Kellar Co., 704 F.2d 1313, 1314 (4th Cir.
1983).
66. Emergency Rule, supra note 63, at 521(c), 522(d)(3)(A).
67. Id. at 522(d)(3)(B).
68. Id. at 522(e)(2)(B).
69. Id. at 522(d)(3)(A).
70. Id. at 521(c)(2).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 522(e)(2)(B).
73. Hearings, supra note 5, at 1.
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fragmented jurisdiction of the pre-Reform Act system. 74 Senator Heflin read a
prepared statement of Senator Dole in which Senator Dole referred to the resulting
jurisdictional grant in the Reform Act as a "flawed compromise which has returned
to haunt the Congress.'"75
In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court left to Congress the task of restruc-
turing the bankruptcy court system to conform to the requirements of article II "in
the way that [would] best effectuate the legislative purpose. '"76 A number of
alternative solutions to the jurisdictional dilemma could have been adopted. One
solution would have reconstituted the bankruptcy court system as a system of article
III courts. Another possibility advocated a return to some version of the pre-Reform
Act system of plenary/summary jurisdiction, placing bankruptcy judges under the
control of the article III district court judges. A third possible solution was retention
of the broad jurisdictional grant of the Reform Act, adding sufficient limitations on
the power of bankruptcy judges to conform with the requirements of Northern
Pipeline. The solution Congress included in the 1984 Amendments seems to be a
combination of the last two.
Each option had its advantages and disadvantages, its proponents and detractors.
The next part of this Note will examine the choices in light of the goals of the Reform
Act, the constitutional requirements of Northern Pipeline, and the practical effects of
each proposal on the federal judiciary and litigants in the bankruptcy system.
A. Article III Status
The quickest, clearest, and simplest way to eliminate any constitutional uncer-
tainties in the authority of bankruptcy courts would be to confer article III status upon
the judges. 77 Article III status would place the power to adjudicate fully all problems
in a bankruptcy case in a single forum, 78 fulfilling a major goal of the Reform Act by
eliminating excessive delays caused by fragmented jurisdiction and jurisdictional
disputes. 79 Article III status would also enhance the prestige of bankruptcy judge-
ships.80 The status and prestige of a seat on the federal bench are clearly important
incentives in attracting the highest quality judicial candidates. 8' Because cases in
bankruptcy courts today involve billions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of debtors
and creditors, and weighty and complex legal and social issues, attracting high caliber
judges is essential to the establishment of the efficient, far-reaching bankruptcy
system envisioned by Title 11 and the Reform Act. 82
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id.
76. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 n.40 (1982).
77. For an example of the position favoring article III bankruptcy courts, see King, Bankruptcy Code-Specialized
Court Supported, 52 Am. Bawrt. L.J. 193 (1978).
78. HoUSE REoRT, supra note 18, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6010.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. See also SENAT Rmorr, supra note 21, at 17.
82. See King, supra note 77, at 196-97; See also Eisen & Smrtnik, supra note 35.
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The so-called bankruptcy bar, lawyers who spend much if not most of their time
on bankruptcies, almost unanimously favored article I status.83 Their major concern
was that judicial authority be placed in one forum so that decisions that need to be
made in a bankruptcy can be made with speed and certainty. 84 Often speedy decisions
are essential to the survival of a debtor in bankruptcy; unnecessary costs and delays
spent in jurisdictional disputes do not help provide a debtor the legal relief envisioned
by the bankruptcy code.8 5
The major opponents of article III status legislation were the federal judges of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.8 6 The American College of Trial Lawyers
also was opposed and advanced three major arguments against article HI status for
bankruptcy judges. First, establishing specialized federal courts with article III
protections dilutes and violates the concept of a single federal trial court of general
jurisdiction.8 7 Second, the prestige, traditions, and collegiality of the existing federal
judiciary would be threatened.88 Last, creating a large number of article III judges
with life tenure and salary protection when the continuation of the current heavy
bankruptcy workload is questionable might limit Congress' flexibility in managing
the federal court system because changes in the economy or other unpredictable
factors may significantly alter the bankruptcy workload in the future.8 9
The first argument against article III status for the bankruptcy courts, that the
concept of a single federal trial court of general jurisdiction must be maintained and
protected, is not compelling for a number of reasons. The practical reality is that
bankruptcy courts are already functioning as a distinct judicial unit.9o Moreover, the
immensity of both the district courts' and the bankruptcy courts' workload is such that
it is impossible to entertain any realistic notion that bankruptcy cases can be handled
83. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 123 (testimony of Joseph E. Friend, President of the Commercial Law
League of America), reprinted in 87 CoM. L.J. 395, 395-97 (1982).
84. Id.
85. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 181, reprinted in 87 Com. L.J. 395, 397. Friend's testimony quoted the
testimony of Harold Marsh, Chairman of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States as follows:
It is absolutely essential that there be expedition in the determination of bankruptcy proceedings.
The reason for that is the time value of money. If every controversy had to be docketed in the Federal
District Court and put on the calendar and taken up at the end whenever it came up on the calendar, then most
bankruptcy proceedings would not be worth carrying on because there would be nothing left at the end of that
process.
Hearings, supra note 5, at 181, reprinted in 87 Com. L.J. 395, 397 (1982).
86. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 371-426.
87. See id. at 227-29 (statement of the American College of Trial Lawyers). The American College's statement
made reference to the statement of Simon Rifkind, a former federal judge, who previously submitted this argument on
behalf of the American College of Trial Lawyers. Id. at 237-40. Rifkind's statement was published in a short article, along
with Professor Lawrence King's response. Rifkind, Bankruptcy Code-Specialized Court Opposed, 52 Am. BeAN. L.J.
187, 187-91 (1978); King, Bankruptcy Code-Specialized Court Supported, id. at 193, 193-97 (1978).
88. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 229-30 (statement of American College of Trial Lawyers); Rifkind, supra note
87, at 189-90.
89. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 228-29 (statement of American College of Trial Lawyers). It should be noted
that the increase in the number of bankruptcies coincides with the tremendous boom in our society's use of credit. Credit
and bankruptcy go hand in hand, bankruptcy being the down side of a well-entrenched economic practice. As long as credit
continues to play the pervasive economic role it does today, there is no real reason to expect any substantial decline in
bankruptcy filings. See Cyr, Structuring a New Bankruptcy Court: A Comparative Analysis, 52 Am. Ba, R. L.J. 141, 142
(1978).
90. See King, supra note 87, at 193-94.
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in the district courts. 91 Furthermore, Congress intended the Reform Act to advance
the "establishment of a functionally independent bankruptcy court. '"92 At the con-
clusion of hearings on the administrative structure of bankruptcy courts, Subcom-
mittee Chairman Don Edwards observed that segments of the federal judiciary are
ignoring the reality of the situation:
For the last five or six years, we have been hearing witnesses-banks, commercial law
representatives, merchants, business people, and the general public complaining about the
referee system. Actually, we have not had one witness, except the district judges, who
have said that it's working well and that we should be proud of it. 93
The second argument-concern with their traditions, collegiality, and prestige-
ignores the importance of a debtor's right to a time- and cost-efficient reorganization
or discharge and a creditor's right to a swift liquidation of a bankrupt estate. This
self-serving concern ignores the simple fact that unnecessary costs and delays hinder
an efficient determination of litigants' rights and ultimately results in a reduction of
the assets of an estate available for distribution to creditors. 94
The Reform Act clearly recognized the enhanced role bankruptcy law plays in
commerce today. 95 It is clear that one goal of the Reform Act was to enhance the
prestige of bankruptcy judgeships so that the most highly qualified candidates would
be attracted to the position. 96 One committee noted that "[tlhe importance and
difficulty of issues coming before the bankruptcy judges will be entirely comparable
to those coming before the United States district court judges and judges of state
courts of general jurisdiction.' ,97 Clearly, the increased prestige of bankruptcy judges
is necessary and deserved in light of the role bankruptcy litigation now plays in
society. Absent persuasive countervailing reasons, bestowing article III status on
bankruptcy judges is the best, and constitutionally surest, way to establish an
efficient, capable bankruptcy system with sufficient powers to do the job it was
intended to do. The argument that increasing the prestige of bankruptcy judges to
article I status would injure the prestige or traditions of the federal judiciary is
self-serving and simply unpersuasive. 98
More persuasive arguments against article III status for the bankruptcy judges
were the additional expense that would result from a large-scale upgrade in status and
the limited time that Congress had in which to formulate an appropriate plan. 99 The
91. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39, 43-44.
92. S. REP. No. 989, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1978). See also id. at 345-46.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. See supra note 5.
95. HoUsE REPORT, supra note 18, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEws 6010. See also REroRT OF
TE SuBco.a. ON CML AND CON srTmoNAL RIrrs OF mE COM. ON THE JUDICIAY, 95TH CoNo., 2o SEsS., REPORT ON HE ms
ON THE CouRT ADHm~asmAivE SmucrurE FOR BAN e urcy CAsS 368 (Comm. Print 1978).
96. See 124 CoNo. REc. 28,258 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini introducing the final compromise legislation).
97. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6010.
98. See Suco.mM. ON CML AND CONSTrTmiONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JIscIAY, 95T CONG., 21o SEsS., RE'osr
ON HEARINGS ON um CoURT Amsunsri-nvE SRucrtnm FOR BANKRWrcY CAsEs 368 (Comm. Print 1978).
99. The final form of the Reform Act legislation was a compromise. Senator Thurmond stated: "I want to see
bankruptcy reform in this session of Congress, but I [am] unwilling to accept legislation that would lead to an excessive
cost to the government and an unreasonable expansion of the federal bureaucracy." 124 Co~a. REc. 34,019 (1978).
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"wholesale" creation of over 200 article II judgeships having life tenure was not
particularly attractive to some members of Congress.10o The number of bankruptcy
judges needed might fluctuate with the economy or other unpredictable factors.' 0'
The life tenure requirement would eliminate to some degree Congress' flexibility in
shaping the federal judiciary, and the costs would clearly be somewhat higher due to
increased salary and pension requirements. Finally, the prospect of finding enough
qualified candidates in a short amount of time posed yet another obstacle. 102
However, the practical problems were not insurmountable, and many cost-
minimizing ideas were presented to Congress. For instance, although an article III
judge must be appointed with life tenure, the judgeship need not be refilled upon
vacancy if not required by the workload. 10 3 Thus, any new article III bankruptcy
judgeships could have been self-expiring. Another idea advocated establishing in each
district a limited number of article III bankruptcy judges. 0 4 An appropriate number
of non-article HI bankruptcy judges would have remained under the authority of the
article IlI bankruptcy judges. The non-article III judges would not have life tenure.
Flexibility thus could have been maintained in case the need for active judges
decreased significantly or if some other circumstance compelled a restructuring of the
court system. Yet another idea called for establishing an entirely independent U.S.
bankruptcy court system with article III judges in the bankruptcy appellate division
and non-article III bankruptcy judges in the trial court division.105 Bankruptcy judges'
salaries and benefits would be kept lower than those of the district judges. 10 This
would help to alleviate two of the major pressures against establishing article HI
judgeships. First, it would help minimize the long term costs which would be incurred
by creating a large number of higher paying, life-tenure judgeships. Second, it might
help ease the tension for the district court judges by preserving for them higher pay
and thus higher status.
Congress could have devised some plan creating article HI judgeships in the
bankruptcy court system which would have minimized the practical obstacles. A
solution using some form of article III bankruptcy judgeship would have provided a
single forum for a full adjudication of bankruptcy cases, solved the constitutionality
problem, and achieved an important goal of the Reform Act by firmly establishing the
independence of the bankruptcy court system.
Apparently Senator Thurmond, a powerful legislator, was a major force behind the Senate's objections to article I status
for bankruptcy judges. See Kee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAuL L. Rv. 941, 954 (1979).
100. See Riflind, supra note 87, at 190.
101. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 228-29 (statement of American College of Trial Lawyers); see also id. at 237
(testimony of Simon H. Rifkind).
102. Id. at 228, 240; see also Rilkind, supra note 87, at 191.
103. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 122 (testimony of Professor Lawrence King).
104. Id. at 292-93, 300-01.
105. Cyr, Structuring a New Bankruptcy Court: A Comparative Analysis, 52 Am. BANKR. L.J. 141, 152-53 (1978).
106. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 296.
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B. Return to a Form of the Referee System
Because the broad jurisdictional grant in the Reform Act was intended to cure
some major problems with the referee system, Congress gave little serious consid-
eration to returning to the referee system's plenary/summary jurisdiction dichotomy
and "stepchild" court structure.10 7 However, the bankruptcy system after the 1984
Amendments is quite similar to the referee system in many ways.
Many of the procedural provisions in the 1984 Amendments were intended to
prohibit the bankruptcy courts from hearing claims which would put their jurisdiction
in jeopardy of exceeding the article III limitations on their powers. These provisions
provide that a bankruptcy court may hear any core bankruptcy proceeding but must
abstain from hearing any non-core proceedings. 108 However, if a non-core proceeding
is "related to" a case under Title 11, the bankruptcy judge may hear the claim but
may only propose findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court."' 9
Litigation over attempts to interpret and apply these provisions will surely produce the
same results as did litigation over plenary and summary jurisdiction in the referee
system. 110
V. Tm 1984 AMENDMENTs' SOLUTIONS TO THE JURISDICTIONAL DILEmmA
Congress chose to solve the jurisdictional dilemma posed by Northern Pipeline
by placing the jurisdiction over bankruptcy and related proceedings in the article I
district courts. Two methods were used in the attempt to assure constitutionality.
First, Congress reconstituted the bankruptcy courts, emphasizing their role as ad-
juncts to the district courts. 1"' The jurisdictional grant is made directly to the district
courts in an attempt to establish the adjunct character of the bankruptcy courts." 12
Second, the proceedings a bankruptcy judge may hear are restricted: the bankruptcy
court is not enpowered to enter final determinations in certain proceedings, absent
consent of the parties. 113 By these measures, the district courts alone are purportedly
107. Id. at 275-77.
108. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
109. Id. § 157(c)(1).
110. Referring to the broad language in § 157 defiming "core proceedings," the President of the Comnercial Law
League of America noted that "there will be ample, frequent, and, unfortunately expensive litigation over the proper court
in which to hear a particular case." Chatz & Schumm, 1984 Bankruptcy Code Amendments-Fresh from the Anvil, 89
Co.m. L.J. 317, 321 (1984).
111. See generally 28 U.S.C.A. 99 1334, 151, 158 OVest Supp. 1985). See also id. § 152(a)(1), (b)(1), § 157(a),
(c)(1), (c)(2), (d).
112. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) & (b) (West Supp. 1985) (providing that the district court shall have "original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11" and "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under tite 1 I"). It is interesting to note that these provisions are not new.
They are taken verbatim from 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) & (b) (1982), respectively (as added by § 241(a) of the Reform Act),
and were not eliminated entirely by § 114 of the 1984 Amendments, but were merely moved from Title 28, chapter 90
(District Courts and Bankruptcy Courts) to chapter 85 (District Courts' Jurisdiction).
113. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 157 (West Supp. 1985). The district court is required to hear any personal injury
tort claims or wrongful death claims. Id. § 157(b)(2)(B), (b)(5). A bankruptcy court may only make proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law in "a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under
title I1." Id. § 157(c)(1). Fifteen matters common to bankruptcy litigation are listed as "core proceedings." Id.
§ 157(b)(2). See infra note 131. The fifteen items are not exclusive, and a "determination that a proceeding is not a core
proceeding shall not be made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by state law." 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(3)
(West Supp. 1985). See also id. § 1334.
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exercising the judicial power, and the requirements of article III are presumably
met.
The 1984 Amendments establish the bankruptcy judges as units of the district
court in each judicial district. 14 The bankruptcy judges are considered judicial
officers of the article III district court. 115 They are appointed for fourteen-year terms
by the court of appeals of the respective circuit after considering recommendations by
the Judicial Conference. 16 The provision allowing the bankruptcy courts to exercise
"all" of the jurisdiction conferred upon the district courts is eliminated." 7  In
addition, jurisdiction over a debtor's property now lies in the district courts rather than
in the bankruptcy courts. 118 These provisions indicate a compromise between the
Reform Act's goal of establishing an independent bankruptcy court system and the
constitutional requirement of maintaining bankruptcy courts that are truly adjunct to
the district courts.
Original jurisdiction over all cases and civil proceedings arising under Title 11
is now in the district courts. "19 The district court may provide that any or all such cases
be referred to a bankruptcy judge.120 Consequently, a bankruptcy court will get its
cases only by referral from the article III district court.' 2 ' The referral is clearly
optional, 122 and the district court may withdraw any case or proceeding so referred at
any time for cause shown, on its own motion, or on that of any party. 123 The idea is
to survive constitutional scrutiny by reestablishing the dominance of the article III
district courts over any proceeding in bankruptcy courts.
In a key provision, the Amendments restrict the types of cases or proceedings
that the bankruptcy judges may hear. 124 For instance, personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims must now be tried in the district courts.12 5 District judges may
refer to bankruptcy judges only cases under Title 11, proceedings arising under Title
11, proceedings arising in a case under Title 11, or proceedings related to a case under
Title 11.126 Of these, a bankruptcy judge may only "hear and determine all cases
114. 28 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 1985).
115. Id. § 152(a)(1).
116. Id. The appointment by the court of appeals amended the Reform Act's provision for the President to appoint
the bankruptcy judges. That provision never took effect. While the Court never discussed the appointment feature in
Northern Pipeline, it is clear that Congress believed appointments by the Judiciary would help establish the adjunctness
of the bankruptcy courts. On the other hand, Congress also provided for greater independence from the district courts by
placing the appointment power in the courts of appeal rather than the district courts, as was the case prior to the Reform
Act. The fourteen-year terms are another compromise between a separate, independent bankruptcy system and a truly
adjunct system.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1982) repealed by Pub. L. 98-353, tit. I, § 114, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 343. The
provision in the Reform Act which granted broad jurisdiction to the bankruptcy judges and was thus held unconstitutional
provided that " [t]he bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall exercise all of the
jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts." Id. (emphasis added).
118. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(d) (West Supp. 1985). Exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's estate was granted to the
bankruptcy court by the Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (1982).
119. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) & (b) (West Supp. 1985).
120. Id. § 157(a).
121. Id. § 157(b)(1).
122. See id. § 157(a).
123. Id. § 157(d).
124. Id. § 157(b)(1).
125. Id. § 157(b)(2)(B), (b)(5).
126. Id. § 157(a).
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under [T]itle 11 and all core proceedings arising under [T]itle 11, or arising in a case
under [T]itle 11." 127 In these cases and core proceedings, the bankruptcy judge will
be making final orders subject only to review in the district courts under the traditional
"clearly erroneous" standard. 128 In cases and proceedings in which the bankruptcy
court is empowered to enter final judgments, it takes appeals in the same manner as
courts of appeals review decisions of district courts in civil proceedings. 129
A. Core versus Non-Core Proceedings
Congress intended the distinction between "core" and "non-core" proceedings
to ensure that the non-article I bankruptcy courts do not determine claims when
jurisdiction is independent of a "public right" created by Congress in Title 11.130
Sixteen proceedings common to a bankruptcy are listed as nonexclusive examples of
core proceedings.131 The provision further provides that a determination whether a
proceeding is core or non-core is not to be made solely on the basis that its resolution
may be affected by state law. 132 Any "related, but non-core" state law claim may not
be heard in the federal court if the federal courts have no basis for jurisdiction other
than the bankruptcy proceeding and an action could be timely adjudicated in an
appropriate state forum. 133 In this way constitutional requirements are ostensibly met.
The new provisions will prevent bankruptcy judges from making final determi-
nations in non-core proceedings. 134 In a non-core proceeding that is otherwise related
to a case under Title 11, a bankruptcy judge may only propose findings of fact
and conclusions of law to the district court. 135 The district judge is then to enter any
final orders or judgments after considering the proposed findings and conclusions and
reviewing de novo "those matters to which [a] party has timely and specifically
127. Id. § 157(b)(1). See infra note 131.
128. 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
129. Id. § 158(c).
130. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-76 (1982).
131. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2) (Vest Supp. 1985), provides:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and
estimation of claims or interest for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11 but not
the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against
the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title I1 ;(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons
filing claims against the estate;(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;(E) orders to turn over property of the
estate; (F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;(G) motions to terminate, annul or modify
the automatic stay;(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;(I) determinations
as to the dischargeability of particular debts;(J) objections to discharges;(K) determinations of the validity,
extent, or priority of liens;(L) confimations ofplans;(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including
the use of cash collateral;(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims
brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate; and(O) other proceedings
affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security
holder relationship except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
132. Id. § 157(b)(3).
133. Id. § 1334(c)(2).
134. Id. § 157(b)(3). See, e.g., Morse Electric Co. v. Logicon, Inc., 47 Bankr. 234, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985);
Macon Prestressed Concrete Co. v. Duke, 46 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985); Mohawk Indus. v. Robinson Indus.,
46 Bankr. 464 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
135. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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objected.' '1 36 Apparently, the key change is that a district court now must review de
novo a narrow line of matters-those in non-core proceedings in which the parties
have not consented to adjudication by the bankruptcy court and to which a party has
specifically and timely objected.
B. Treatment of a Northern Pipeline Claim Under the 1984 Amendments
An obvious question is how a claim similar to the claim asserted in Northern
Pipeline will be treated under the new provisions of the 1984 Amendments. Northern
Pipeline involved the assertion of state law claims by a debtor against a party who had
no claim against the debtor's estate.' 37 It seems likely that Congress intended such a
claim to be considered a proceeding "related to" the case under Title 11, not a
"core" proceeding under the new provision. 138 Assuming this would be the deter-
mination, a bankruptcy judge could hear the claim but could only enter proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 139 The district court judge would then
consider the findings and review de novo the matters to which any of the parties
specifically and timely objected. 140 It appears that the Marathon Pipe Line Company
objected to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy judge. 14 1 Assuming a party has timely
and specifically objected, the non-article III bankruptcy judge is not empowered by
the Amendments to enter a final judgment.142 The district court is required to review
the proposed findings and conclusions of law de novo. 43 Hence, in a situation like
Northern Pipeline, the Amendments provide that the article I district court will be
the court actually exercising the federal judicial authority.
Apparently Congress has heeded the advice of Chief Justice Burger in adopting
the 1984 Amendments. In his dissenting opinion he advised:
It will not be necessary for Congress, in order to meet the requirements of the Court's
holding, to undertake a radical restructuring of the present system of bankruptcy adjudi-
cation. The problems arising from [the Northern Pipeline] decision can be resolved simply
by providing that ancillary common-law actions, such as the one involved in [Northern
Pipeline], be routed to the United States district court of which the bankruptcy court is an
adjunct. 44
The new provisions were written narrowly, as Chief Justice Burger advised, to
require only that a certain class of claims-non-core proceedings with respect to
which a party specifically and timely objects to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction-
be reviewed de novo by an article HI district court judge.
136. Id.
137. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56 (1982). Northern's suit included
claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress.
138. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1982).
142. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
143. Id.
144. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan noted in Northern Pipeline that "the 'adjunct' bankruptcy courts
created by the [Reform] Act exercise jurisdiction behind the facade of a grant to the
district courts .... "145 This may indicate that Justice Brennan, at least, will not
accept the mere form of "adjunct" bankruptcy courts, as structured in the Amend-
ments, over the substance of the substance of the courts' actual operation and the
nature of claims the bankruptcy courts actually determine. 146 He further rejected the
appellants' suggestion that article III is satisfied as long as there is some degree of
judicial review. 147 He said:
That suggestion is directly contrary to the text of our Constitution ... [because article III
provides that] [t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts ... [shall have life
tenure and protections from salary reductions] . . . . [T]he constitutional
requirements . . . must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only on
appeal .... 148
Justice Rehnquist stated that he was "likewise of the opinion that the extent of review
by Art. III courts provided on appeal from a decision of the Bankruptcy Court in a
case such as Northern's does not save the grant of authority to the latter . . ' I49
Though it is possible that the de novo review provided by the Amendments
would be sufficient to meet constitutionality in Justice Rehnquist's view, constitu-
tionality is far from certain. While Justice Rehnquist's view was that traditional
appellate review by an article III court was insufficient to save the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy system after the Reform Act, he gave no indication whether de novo
review of certain matters, such as those to which a party specifically and timely
objects, would be enough to meet the requirements of article 111.150 Given Justice
Brennan's statement in footnote 39 and his finding of a mere "facade" of adjunctness
in the Reform Act, it is not at all certain that the narrow de novo review provided for
in the 1984 Amendments will pass constitutional muster. 151
C. Inadequacies of the Attempt to Assure the Adjunct Character of the Bankruptcy
System
The changes in the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts imposed by the 1984
Amendments, which attempt to assure that the bankruptcy courts are adjunct to the
district courts, are inadequate for a number of reasons. Bankruptcy litigants still do
not have the opportunity to receive an efficient determination of all the issues in a
single forum. An important goal of the Reform Act was eliminating fragmented
jurisdiction and the resulting costly and time-consuming litigation over jurisdiction
prevalent in the pre-1978 bankruptcy system. 152 The 1984 Amendments have not
achieved this goal. 153 Litigation will be required to determine if a proceeding is a
145. Id. at 86.
146. Id.
147. Id. at n.39.
148. Id. (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 91.
150. See id. at 91-92.
151. Id. at 86, n.39.
152. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 273.
153. See supra note 113.
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"core" proceeding or a "related" proceeding. 154 Since the bankruptcy judge is to
make the determination whether a proceeding is core or related, appeals and litigation
will result merely over whether a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to make the
determination.15 5 Any litigant who would rather be in state court or who might benefit
from using protracted delay as a bargaining chip will probably litigate this jurisdic-
tional issue. The bankruptcy system will be plagued with costly, unnecessary, and
inefficient litigation similar to the litigation over the plenary/summary distinction that
plagued the referee system.
Indeed, the new provisions will add to the piecemeal litigation of bankruptcy
claims. The district court can now withdraw a proceeding from the bankruptcy court
at any time for any reason.156 In addition, the Amendments contain a provision that
appears to require a district court to withdraw a proceeding which requires interpre-
tation of Title 11 and other federal laws, 157 further fragmenting jurisdiction. This
fragmentation does not further the Reform Act's goal of allowing a single bankruptcy
to be tried efficiently in a single forum.
The 1984 Amendments do not upgrade the status of bankruptcy judgeships. The
bankruptcy courts are placed even more under the thumb of the district courts than
before. The Amendments fail to recognize the role which the bankruptcy system plays
in commercial law. As a result, it will be more difficult to attract highly qualified
individuals to the bankruptcy bench.I5 8 Given the volume and importance of bank-
ruptcy litigation, this measure may dilute the quality of the federal bench far more
than installing article III bankruptcy courts would.' 59
The lack of a clear majority position in Northern Pipeline makes it difficult to
predict whether the bankruptcy court system as amended is constitutional.160 It is
154. See, e.g., In re Morse Elec. Co., 47 Bankr. 234, 236-37 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) (finding debtor's claims
"non-core" but "related"); In re Lion Capital Group, 46 Bankr. 850-54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); Macon Prestressed
Concrete Co. v. Duke, 46 Bankr. 727, 730 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985); Mohawk Indus. v. Robinson Indus., 46 Bankr. 464
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); In re Illinois-California Express, Inc., 50 Bankr. 232 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
155. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
156. Id. § 157(d). "The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this
section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown." Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id. "The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that
resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating
organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce." Id. (emphasis added). The legislative history on the Amend-
ments is sparse and sheds little light on the purpose of this provision. James Chatz, president of the Commercial Law
League, and Brooke Schumm III speculated that the intent was probably to keep major anti-trust cases from being
adjudicated in the bankruptcy court. Chatz & Schumm, 1984 Bankruptcy Code Amendments-Fresh from the Anvil, 89
Co. L.J. 317, 321 (1984).
158. Opponents of a more independent bankruptcy court system argued that it would be more difficult to attract high
quality individuals to become district court judges because the prestige of a position on the federal bench would be diluted
if bankruptcy judges were given article III protections. Rifkind, Bankruptcy Code-Specialized Court Opposed, 52 Am.
BAKr. L.J. 187, 189-90 (1978). Rifkind maintains there has not been any problem attracting the sufficient quality of
persons to become bankruptcy judges despite the lack of status and prestige. Id. at 190. His argument is refuted by
Professor King. See King, Bankruptcy Code-Specialized Court Supported, 52 A1. BANK. L.J. 193, 195-96 (1978).
159. Between July I, 1982, and July 1, 1983, more bankruptcy cases were filed in the federal courts than civil and
criminal proceedings combined. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
160. At the time of this writing, one court had already held the Amendments unconstitutional under Northern
Pipeline. In re Associated Grocers of Nebraska Coop., Inc. v. Nabisco Brands, 46 Bankr. 173 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1984).
The court interpreted the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline as allowing non-article Illjudges to hear only purely public
rights, holding that a contested preference payment was not such a public right. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(F) (West
Supp. 1985).
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interesting to note that the 1984 Amendments take the solution suggested in Chief
Justice Burger's dissent.1 61 Constitutionality is ostensibly met by measures purport-
edly assuring that bankruptcy courts are truly adjuncts of the district court. 162 In
theory, the district courts are exercising the judicial power, but it is unclear whether
this position will meet the approval of a majority of the Supreme Court. An opposing
view, which the Court may well take, is that the policy of article III is to assure that
the federal judiciary is independent. 63 Without the protections of life tenure and
salary guarantees, the independence of the bankruptcy courts can not be assured.
Moreover, if the provision for de novo review in the article III district courts is not
exercised with diligence, the mere form of this supposed constitutional protection
should not prevail over the substance of the situation. 164 The constitutional require-
ment of article III may not be satisfied merely by purporting to place the judicial
authority in the district courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems in the bankruptcy court system have not been solved by the 1984
Amendments. The jurisdiction and status of the bankruptcy court system are simply
not commensurate with the role the system plays in the federal judiciary or in
commerce today. Rather than solving the problems, the 1984 Amendments create
more. The ambiguity of such provisions as "core" and "non-core" proceedings will
result in distinctions difficult to apply and senseless uncertainty over what cases the
bankruptcy system can determine. 165 The provisions addressing abstention and
revocation of referral will result in piecemeal litigation of bankruptcy cases in
multiple forums. Bankruptcy litigants will continue to be plagued with wasteful
disputes over jurisdiction.16 6 Instead of taking a step forward from the problems
caused by the "flawed compromise" in the Reform Act, the restrictive jurisdiction
of the 1984 Amendments is a step back toward the troubled pre-Reform Act
system. 167
161. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92 (1982) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). The Chief Justice joined in the dissenting opinion of Justice White, but he wrote separately to emphasize that
the Court's holding was limited to the narrow proposition that a state common law action not made subject to a federal
rule of decision and not directly related to an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law, absent the consent of the
litigant, could only be heard by an article III federal court. Id. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
162. For the proposition that the requirements of article III are strict, see Krattenmaker, supra note 4 and Currie,
Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREc;roN L. Rev. 441 (1983). Chairman Rodino of the House
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law has noted:
The Judiciary Committee and Civil Rights Subcommittee gave lengthy consideration to the constitutional issues
surrounding the court system in both the 94th and 95th Congresses, concluding that the limited circumstances
in which a departure from the requirements of article III have been permitted were not present in the bankruptcy
context. The original bankruptcy bill passed by the House, H.R. 8200, 95th Congress, created the bankruptcy
courts as article 1I courts.
Bankruptcy Court Act of 1982: Hearings on H.R. 6109 before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm, on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) (statement of Chairman Rodino).
163. See generally Currie, supra note 162.
164. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
165. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 fVest Supp. 1985).
166. See supra note 110.
167. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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It is far from certain that the Amendments meet the constitutional requirements
of article III. The lack of a majority in Northern Pipeline makes it difficult to say what
changes the Supreme Court will consider sufficient to place bankruptcy courts safely
within the constitutional restrictions of article I. 168 The history of the congressional
power to establish article I courts sheds little light on the subject. 169 For years, the
courts have had a difficult time enunciating a coherent standard delineating when
Congress has gone too far in delegating the judicial power. 170 The theoretical
distinctions put forth in the past have been strained and widely criticized, and the
various analyses by the present court have been "productive of much confusion and
controversy."' 171 The major problem may be that the clear and simple wording of
article Ill means precisely what it says: federal courts must have the protections of life
tenure and a prohibition against salary decreases, so that the independent exercise of
the judicial power is assured, free from any danger of encroachment by another
branch of the federal government holding the purse strings or employment contract. 72
Whether the Supreme Court will consider the measures adopted in the 1984 Amend-
ments sufficient to bring the bankruptcy court system into compliance with article III
remains to be seen.
Congress could have solved many problems by reestablishing the bankruptcy
court system with judges having article III status. The inadequacies of the present
bankruptcy system outweigh the costs of reestablishing it as an article Ill system.
Litigants could have their cases tried quickly and efficiently in courts of certain and
competent jurisdiction. High quality judges could be attracted to the bankruptcy
bench. The bankruptcy system could do what it was intended to do, without the
burden of wasteful litigation over jurisdictional squabbles. Perhaps most importantly,
constitutionality could have been assured. With the constitutional uncertainty trailing
in the wake of Northern Pipeline, it is quite possible, if not probable, that Congress
will once again have the chance to restructure the bankruptcy court system. Perhaps
then article III status for the judges will be reconsidered as the best way to recognize
the role of the bankruptcy system and to comply with the requirements of article III.
Andrew J. McDonough
168. See generally Redish, supra note 46; Fullerton, supra note 47.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 534 (1962).
172. Krattenmaker phrased the question, "does article III, section one mean what it says?" Krattenmaker, Article
III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEo. L.J. 297, 313 (1981). See
also id. at 299. For a historical perspective of the purpose and application of article Ill, see Currie, supra note 162.
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